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I. INTRODUCTION
The assignment of tasks to the appropriate level of government
is an important aspect of environmental policy design. Because the
costs and benefits of pollution control policies are closely tied to geo-
graphy, political solutions should reflect the underlying spatial
structure of environmental problems. These solutions should not only
incorporate the long-distance effects of air and water pollution, but
also account for the mobility of economic actors and the resource base
of governments.
There are three general types of environmental problems.
Global issues have no complex geographical component. Regional
problems arise when political boundaries do not coincide with the
* Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale
University; Ph.D. (Economics), 1970, Yale University; B., 1964, Wellesley College. This
Article is based on Chapter 3 of the Author's forthcoming book, Controlling Environmental
Policy: The Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United States (forthcoming Yale U.,
1995). The Author wishes to thank Charlotte Burrows and James Rossi for very helpful
research assistance.
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pollution's geographical impact. The environmental effects of local
issues are confined within existing governmental borders.
After outlining the political-economic arguments for the divi-
sion of regulatory authority, I examine the actual pattern in two con-
crete cases: the United States and Germany. Both have advanced
capitalist economies governed by representative federal democracies.
They have similar levels of economic development and energy use and
similar types of pollution problems. Both are viewed as environ-
mental leaders. Public and private spending on environmental pro-
tection is high.' Germany is, however, much smaller in area and
population and is much more densely populated. It is embedded in
the European continent, and its economy depends heavily on cross-
border trade.2 Conditions in other European countries affect the
quality of Germany's air and water.3
American and German federalism have different structures,
and this difference has had an impact on environmental policy.
American federalism gives a strong role to federal officials in the
administration of environmental laws, though in practice the states
1. Expenditures for pollution abatement and control in the United States totaled $85.9
billion in 1988, of which 21% was spent by governments. Council on Environmental Quality,
Environmental Quality: 21st Annual Report 271, Table 9 (1991) ("CEQ Report"). Of the 65.71
quadrillion Btu of energy produced in the United States in 1989, 32.31% was from coal, 26.7%
natural gas, 27.9% crude oil and liquid natural gas, 4.2% hydroelectric, 8.7% nuclear, and 0.19%
from other sources. Most American coal is bituminous. Id. at 290, Table 16. Only 9% of 1989
U.S. coal production was lignite. Id. at 291, Table 17. Per capita energy consumption in 1990
was 341 million Btu. Id. at 298, Table 24. (One Btu is 1.055 X 108joule.)
Public spending on the environment in Germany totaled DM 17.4 billion or approximately
$10 billion in 1988, of which DM 8.3 billion was for investments, mostly in sewage treatment
and waste disposal. Spending by business on both investments and operating costs totaled
approximately DM 18 billion, of which about DM 8 billion was investment. Energy consumption
was 11,500 quadrillion joules in the western Ldnder (Germany's equivalent of states) in 1989.
The proportions were 27% from coal (8% lignite), 17% natural gas, 40% oil, 12% nuclear, and 3%
other. Umweltbundesamt, Daten zur Umwelt 1990/91 at 19 (Erich Schmidt, 1992). In the east,
consumption was 4,000 quadrillion joules with two-thirds from lignite. Id. at 21.
2. The population of the United States was 250.4 million in 1990. Population density
was 26.7 people per square kilometer. Gross domestic product (GDP) in 1989 was $5,132 billion
in current dollars or about $20,600 per capita. Exports and imports were approximately 10% of
GDP. OECD, OECD in Figures: Statistics of the Member Countries 7, 27 (1991) ("OECD in
Figures'; CEQ Report at 263 (cited in note 1).
Germany at the end of 1990 had a population of 79.6 million, of which 15.9 million lived in
the former German Democratic Republic. Germany had a population density of 223 people per
square kilometer. GDP in the western Ldnder was $1,189.2 billion in 1989 or $19,200 per
capita. Import and export volumes were nearly one quarter of GDP. OECD in Figures at 6, 26;
Rudolph Bauer, Sebastian Klinke, and Stefan Pabst, Meeting Needs in Germany 4 (U. of Bremen
Inst. for Local Social Policy and Nonprofit Orgs., 2d ed. 1992).
3. See Umweltbundesamt, Daten zur Umwelt 1990/91 at 214-19 (cited in note 1)
(showing the volume of sulfur and nitrogen oxides transported in and out of the western and
eastern parts of Germany). Countries to the north and west generally export more than they
import and those to the east and south import more than they export.
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carry out much of the day-to-day implementation. Earmarked match-
ing grants and federal oversight of state efforts provide high levels of
central influence. In contrast, the German federal system delegates
implementation to the states and localities with federal statutes,
regulations, and guidelines providing the regulatory structure. For
some environmental issues only federal framework statutes are
permitted, giving the states considerable independent lawmaking
authority. Earmarked intergovernmental grants are unimportant
and face constitutional limits, but federal subsidies and tax breaks for
industry are a recognized aspect of environmental policy.
Although both Germany and the United States have
recognized the complex geographical character of environmental
problems, neither has done an adequate job of matching problems to
government structures. To oversimplify, Germany seems too
decentralized and the United States too centralized. Part of the
problem derives from the countries' respective constitutional
structures, but much of it is a by-product of substantive
environmental law.
II. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROBLEMS
Global problems occur when the benefits of environmental
protection depend on the world level of beneficial or harmful sub-
stances produced, irrespective of their geographical distribution. No
pollution problem fits this category perfectly, but the depletion of the
ozone layer and global warming come close.4 So, too, does protection
of endangered species if one perceives risks to the entire world from a
decline in the variety of life forms.5
Global problems can be described in apocalyptic terms, but
their economic properties are simple. Once scientific estimates of the
4. See Anne Gallagher, The Wew"Montreal Protocol and the Future of International Law
for Protection of the Global Environment, 14 Houston J. Int'l L. 267, 270-77 (1992) (discussing
the problems of depletion of the ozone layer). For a treatment of global warming, see generally
Richard Morgenstern, Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Change, 81 Am.
Econ. Rev.-Papers & Proc. 140 (1991), and William Nordhaus, A Sketch of the Economics of the
Greenhouse Effect, 81 Am. Econ. Rev.-Papers & Proc. 146 (1991).
5. David Pearce estimates that if each "adult person in wealthy countries of the world
[Western Europe, North America, Australia] would be willing to contribute $8 per annum to an
'Amazon Conservation Fund,' the resulting $3.2 billion would enable the people responsible for
more than 25 per cent of the economic output of Amazonia to be compensated for ceasing their
activities." David W. Pearce, An Economic Approach to Saving the Tropical Forests, in Dieter
Helm, ed., Economic Policy Towards the Environment 239, 259 (Blackwell, 1991). Pearce
considers $8 to be a conservative estimate of the value placed on rain forest species. Id. at 258.
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link between discharges and damages are made, policymakers must
set a global level of allowable discharge and design a system to dis-
tribute costs among the responsible parties and deep pockets of the
world.6 One possible solution is a system of pollution rights by which
the generators of harmful substances either purchase the right to
discharge limited amounts or else engage in cleanup activities.7 If
some dischargers are located in countries that are poor or otherwise
especially worthy, these countries can receive pollution rights that
they can use for their own producers or sell on the world market. 8
Although many scientific issues remain unresolved and the political
problems are complex and often intractable, the economic analysis is
clear cut.
The greatest political and analytic difficulties occur when
pollution damages depend on geography, meteorology, or the proper-
ties of bodies of water. Most air and water pollution falls into this
category of regional problems. It is not enough to know the total
volume of sulfur dioxide discharged into the air or the amount of
domestic sewage emptied into the water. One must also know where
the wind and water carry discharges, how they combine with other
pollutants, and how the populations of people, trees, and wildlife are
distributed relative to the distribution of pollution. The optimal level
of cleanup may vary by location9 The distribution of causes and
effects over geographic areas does not respect political boundaries.
6. Some policies involve limiting uses, such as banning the use of chlorofluorocarbons in
spray cans to protect the ozone layer. Daniel F. McInnis, Ozone Layers and Oligopoly Profits, in
Michael S. Greve and Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private
Rewards 129, 145-50 (Praeger, 1992). Such regulations prejudge the relative importance of
various uses rather than leave it to the market to allocate the reduced supply through higher
prices.
7. Thomas H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, in Dieter
Helm, ed., Economic Policy Towards the Environment 86, 88-90 (cited in note 5). See generally
Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels, International Trade in Carbon Emission Rights: A
Decomposition Procedure, 81 Am. Econ. Rev.-Papers & Proc. 135 (1991) (analyzing a system of
carbon emission rights to control greenhouse warming); Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon
Tax: The Introduction of the Carbon-Burned Tax (CBT), 10 UCLA J. Envir. L. & Policy 221
(1992) (analyzing a carbon tax).
8. For an attempt to develop such a scheme, see generally Adam L. Aronson, Note, From
"Cooperator's Loss" to Cooperative Gain. Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 Yale L. J.
2143 (1993). Such proposals, of course, have a somewhat utopian air because no global
authority exists that is capable of administering such a program. See Scott Barrett, The
Problem of Global Environmental Protection, in Helm, ed., Economic Policy Towards the
Environment 137, 146-54 (discussing how global cooperation can arise under certain conditions).
9. For example, Dallas Burtraw and Paul Portney report that, in Baltimore, the eco-
nomically efficient standard for total suspended particulates (that is, the point where marginal
benefits equal marginal costs) is nearly 50% greater than the optimal standard for St. Louis.
Dallas Burtraw and Paul R. Portney, Environmental Policy in the United States, in Helm, ed.,
Economic Policy Towards the Environment at 289, 311.
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Economic theory provides a straight-forward, but unrealistic,
answer to the problem: draw "optimal" jurisdictional boundaries.
Since the states have little incentive to consider benefits and costs
that accrue to out-of-state residents, the government should create
special purpose authorities with jurisdictional boundaries designed to
internalize external effects. 10 For example, a single authority should
regulate upstream and downstream water users. Dischargers and
breathers in a single air basin should be included in the same juris-
diction.
As a practical matter, this principle leads to an unmanageable
number of overlapping governmental entities, forcing a search for
second-best solutions. Federal matching-grant programs are one
option. Without creating new government authorities or redrawing
boundaries, grants could give states and localities an incentive to take
responsibility for the external effects of their pollution." Conversely,
instead of subsidizing pollution control, the federal government could
tax states on their interstate emissions. For example, states could be
charged fees based on the volume of pollutants in water that crosses
state lines. Managing externalities, thus, provides a normative ar-
gument for incentive-based cooperative federalism.
Implementing matching-grant programs or tax systems under
this principle would be a complex enterprise. The federal government
cannot simply set a single matching rate or unit tax. Most interstate
externalities are asymmetric. One group of states-upstream
polluters or energy-producing states-imposes costs on other
states--downstream water users or energy-using states-without
reciprocation. This circumstance means that states should face
different tax or matching rates depending on the degree of interstate
externality.
III. LOCAL PROBLEMS
Local problems are confined within existing political bounda-
ries. At first glance, it seems obvious that decision-making authority
should devolve to low-level governments for such problems as noise,
10. See generally Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 16-20, 31-53 (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1972); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence': The Division of
Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government, 69 Am. Econ. Rev.-Papers & Proc. 479
(1979) (arguing that a majority of state legislatures should be able to veto federal legislation).
11. See generally Albert Breton, A Theory of Government Grants, 31 Canadian J. Econ. &
Pol. Sci. 175 (1965); Oates, Fiscal Federalism at 65-118.
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local parks, and waste dumps. Each community would weigh the
costs and benefits of various degrees of environmental protection and
choose the one that fits its tastes and pocketbook.
Devolution must, however, be done with care. The national
government must establish a framework for local decision-making
processes and act when the benefits of standardized solutions
outweigh the advantages of local control. Economies of scale in pro-
duction and the mobility of regulated firms and households may re-
quire centralized policy making.
Consider, first, economies of scale. Federal action may be
justified if the costs of diverse local rules outweigh the benefits.
Uniform national regulation may produce economies of scale of pro-
duction and distribution for firms with national markets. Federal
preemption may also reduce search costs for firms seeking new pro-
duction and distribution locations. The argument for centralized
standards is strengthened if local governments use idiosyncratic rules
to benefit local enterprises at the expense of citizens and national
corporations. 12 Federal product standards need not, however, pre-
empt local restrictions entirely. Thus, a federal standard on the noise
produced by motorcycles or power tools could be combined with local
rules limiting nighttime use and restricting the places where noise
may be produced. Local governments would, however, be prohibited
from making rules that directly contradict the federal standard.
Second, consider mobility and its interaction with property
rights. Efficient plant location choices require a uniform system of
property rules, but state and local environmental regulations can
affect entitlements. To illustrate the problem, suppose one local
government levies a tax on those who generate loud noises. The tax is
levied per decibel of noise produced per hour. A second town directly
regulates the level of noise and imposes fines on violators. Consider a
12. For example, in the American chemical industry, national fhns appear to have a
relatively weak bargaining position at the state level: Moving costs are high once capital is in
place, and the industry is very capital intensive. Large chemical companies have, thus, actively
supported uniformity in a number of regulatory areas. The chemical industry joined with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA') in support of uniform national
labeling standards. Jerry L. Mashaw and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in
George C. Eads and Michael Fix, eds., The Reagan Regulatory Strategy: An Assessment 111,
133-34 (Urban Inst., 1984). Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Chemical
Manufacturers Association ("CMA' favored uniform federal standards. The CMA worried that
"[viariations in state priorities could result in cost disadvantages for existing facilities due to
geographic location." David Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs under the Federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 12 Envir. L. 679, 712 n.136 (1982) (citing Comments of
the Chemical Manufacturer's Association on EPA's Proposed Consolidated Permit Regulations
#189 at 179-80 (Sept. 12, 1979)).
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noise producer that would meet the second town's standard in which-
ever town it locates. 13 If the noise producer is mobile and can shift
towns without cost, it will locate in the second town. It avoids the tax
levied in the first town with no change in noise produced. From the
standpoint of efficiency, the firm should be indifferent between the
two towns, but, in fact, it is not. The different policy tools chosen
affect location decisions in inefficient ways. Town one's noise fee,
though levied on a per decibel basis, acts like a tax on locating in town
one. To avoid such outcomes, the central government should specify
the type of policy (i.e. taxes or standards) and leave it to the local
governments to decide on the appropriate level. Otherwise, local
governments would be deciding both the level of noise and the prop-
erty entitlements of noise producers.
This problem of property entitlements has generally been
ignored in the debate over whether jurisdictions are in a race to the
bottom or a race to the top when they use regulatory policy to compete
for business. Most theoretical work on inteijurisdictional competition
assumes that the basic policy instrument has been fixed a priori.
Jurisdictions are only free to decide on its level. 14 For example, if
effluent fees are the policy tool, each local government decides what
fee to set. Each one trades off environmental cleanliness against jobs
in a way that reflects the preferences of that community's residents.
Under strong competitive assumptions for both communities and
businesses, the result of inteijurisdictional competition will be an
efficient allocation of jobs and pollution loads.15 If, however, some
communities set standards for individual firms while others assess
effluent fees, the efficiency of the final result is compromised as firms
seek to avoid paying fees.
If the problem being regulated is pervasive, however, land
rents in the first community, which imposes charges, will fall,
reflecting its more expensive regulatory environment. Land rents will
13. In other words, the tax in town one has been set to give the noise producer an incen-
tive to reach the noise level mandated in town two.
14. See, for example, Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition
Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. Pub. Econ. 333, 336
(1988). Oates and Schwab assume that each community sets the ratio of emissions to labor
force. They note that the results would not be changed "if communities use certain other policy
tools such as taxes on emissions rather than the command and control strategy." Id. at 336 n.2.
They do not, however, consider the case in which some communities use fees and others use
standards.
15. See id. These authors go on to consider cases where efficiency does not prevail. The
recent theoretical articles are summarized for a legal audience in Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition. Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992).
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adjust so that marginal producers are indifferent between the two
communities. This result, although an equilibrium, will not generally
be efficient. The differing land rents will produce divergent
investment choices for businesses and residents in each town even if
the underlying real economic factors are equivalent. Only a lump-
sum tax in the second town, or a subsidy in the first, would
successfully neutralize the impact of tool choice, and it seems unlikely
that towns would be able to coordinate their efforts to set the correct
fees and subsidies.
The ability of states to act as "laboratories" for innovative
policies may also be undermined by firms' preferences for standards
versus equally restrictive fees. Supporters of decentralized regulatory
policy point to the advantage of encouraging experimentation at state
and local levels. New ideas can be tested on a small scale, and other
jurisdictions can copy successful initiatives.16 This view of federalism
can be criticized on a number of grounds,17 but it is especially
problematic in the face of inteijurisdictional business mobility. A
state-level property rights solution that reduces the profits of firms
cannot receive a fair test under these conditions. Businesses will fail
to locate in the experimenting jurisdiction, not because the
implementation strategy is inefficient or ineffective, but simply
because they will earn lower profits than in a jurisdiction using
equally stringent command-and-control regulation.
In principle, this problem with market schemes could be
corrected through appropriate lump sum transfers, but once again, it
seems highly unlikely that jurisdictions will take steps to assure that
businesses earn the same level of excess profits everywhere. Without
such a compensatory policy, land rents will fall in the experimenting
jurisdiction to offset the increased cost of doing business there, but
such a shift in prices will hamper efforts to evaluate the policy
16. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also the statement of Robert Meriam, Chairman, U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, American Federalism: Toward a More Effective
Partnership 2 (Natl Conf. of Am. Federalism in Action, 1975). The benefits of injurisdictional
competition in the development of corporate law are defended in Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
17. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593 (1980) (arguing that few politicians have strong
incentives to support risky innovations and that those who do will not design "experiments"
with scientific validity). See also Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1, 72 (1989-90) (arguing that Brandeis is
expressing a common myth idealizing small-scale democracy).
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experiment in efficiency terms. The behavior of firms will reflect both
the efficiency benefits of the new policy and its impact on property
entitlements.
Unfortunately, the debate over the efficacy of inteijurisdic-
tional competition cannot be resolved simply by requiring the central
government to determine a background regulatory framework.
Suppose, for example, that the federal government supports effluent
fees, but permits individual states to select the fee levels. This strat-
egy will solve the problem of interjurisdictional differences in property
entitlements, but it may not avoid a race to the bottom. A "prisoners'
dilemma" may still operate in which individually rational actions
produce a result that is worse for state governments than a uniform
national fee.18
To see how this can happen, consider a case in which economic
rents or excess profits exist. Interjurisdictional competition favors
relatively mobile groups in this situation.19 Business firms that can
invest in any state have a bargaining advantage over immobile citi-
zens. Firms with little fixed capital, or companies that can credibly
threaten to go out of business, also have a political advantage over
ordinary voters. Governments may try to outdo each other in offering
low levels of environmental regulation. If one government charges a
low fee for waste disposal and another requires waste generators to
pay high fees, mobile waste producers will flock to the low-cost juris-
diction. The transfer will continue until wages, land rents, and other
costs in the low-fee jurisdiction rise enough to compensate for the cost
advantage in waste disposal. Thus, some state and local officials may
support federal laws that limit interstate competition. Because states
will also have an incentive to undercut each other at the implementa-
tion stage, state officials may also support federal enforcement ef-
forts.20
18. For a discussion of the way a "prisoners' dilemma" operates when local governments
compete, see Mashaw and Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation in Eads and Fix, eds.,
The Reagan Regulatory Strategy at 117-18, 122-32 (cited in note 12); Revesz, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
at 1213-27 (cited in note 15); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agendaw The
Reform of the American Regulatory State 166-70 (Free, 1992).
19. "The attraction of decentralization is that it disperses political power. But concerted
private interests have typically found it easy to counter dispersed political power... [A] decen-
tralized political structure [is] vulnerable to challenge by... concentrations of wealth... as
well as to challenges by multinationals...." Gey, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 75 (cited
in note 17). See also id. at 56-60 (characterizing the situation as a "battle" between states and
large corporations).
20. The prisoners' dilemma may not, however, be very important for environmental policy.
The evidence suggests that interstate differences in policy are not a major determinant of firm
location because interstate differences in pollution control costs are a relatively small share of
industrial siting costs. For evidence, see generally Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of
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Some argue, however, that inteijurisdictional competition over
environmental standards is likely to be efficient when cross-border
externalities do not exist.21 Several existing theoretical models
generate this result.22 The most important feature of these models is
the lack of economic rents or excess profits in equilibrium. Thus, in
these models, inteijurisdictional differences simply reflect differences
in preferences. If businesses do not operate in a perfectly competitive
business environment, however, some of their excess profits can be
transferred to local jurisdictions in the form of higher levels of envi-
ronmental quality. Although a tax on excess profits or, even better, a
lump sum tax on the firm would have superior welfare properties,
such levies may, for reasons of internal state politics, be infeasible.
Interjurisdictional competition will, however, prevent such a transfer
of rents. A community that attempts to impose high levels of protec-
tion will find that firms will locate elsewhere if not given a corre-
sponding benefit in some other form, for example, lower wages or
taxes.23
Waste disposal and recycling policies illustrate how local prob-
lems can become national issues because of inteijurisdictional inter-
actions. As long as waste does not seep into ground water or get
converted to air pollution through incineration, waste disposal is a
local problem.24 The basic market failure is the ease with which peo-
Environmental Regulation on Business Location in the United States, 19 Growth & Change 22
(1988); Christopher J. Duerksen, Environmental Regulation of Industrial Plant Siting: How to
Make It Work Better 56-71 (Conservation Found., 1983); Virginia D. McConnell and Robert M.
Schwab, The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Industry Location Decisions: The Motor
Vehicle Industry, 66 Land Econ. 67 (1990).
21. See generally Revesz, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (cited in note 15). Daniel Farber argues that
in general "the market exacts its own inexorable penalties for needlessly burdensome
regulations." Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 Const.
Comm. 395,413 (1986).
22. The most sophisticated is found in Oates and Schwab, 35 J. Pub. Econ. at 335-42 (cited
in note 14). The authors present a model in which communities tax or subsidize mobile capital
and set local environmental quality standards. The analysis demonstrates that, under
competitive market conditions, local choices will be socially optimal if jurisdictions are
homogeneous in workers and use majority rule to make political choices. They also present
more complex models in which this result does not hold.
23. See generally James R. Markusen, Edward R. Morey, and Nancy D. Olewiler,
Competition in Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations Are Endogenous, 41 J.
Pub. Econ. (forthcoming 1994). Their model can produce levels of pollution that are either too
high or too low depending on whether the disutility of pollution is relatively low or high. See
generally James R. Markusen, Edward R. Morey, and Nancy D. Olewiler, Environmental Policy
When Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endogenous, 24 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. 69
(1993) (showing that small policy changes can lead to larger interjurisdictional shifts in firm
locations and pollution levels).
24. Waste disposal becomes a regional problem when it contaminates regional air or water
basins. The most principled response here would be to regulate the production of air and water
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ple can dispose of waste unlawfully without being caught. In most
jurisdictions the state has responded to the difficulty of catching
litterers, not by beefing up the police force, but by providing free trash
and garbage pickup, at least for households. The externalities of
unregulated trash disposal are curbed, but without forcing consumers
(and by extension, retailers and manufacturers) to recognize the cost
of disposal or recycling.
Charging households and firms based on the volume and type
of waste they produce creates an incentive for illegal dumping. If a
community adopts a strict, well-enforced law against illegal dumping,
trash haulers may simply cross jurisdictional borders. A local prob-
lem has become an inteijurisdictional one as a result of a town's pol-
icy choice.25 Thus, a fee system may need to be national (or interna-
tional) in scope to be effective, and it must include a comprehensive
attack on illegal dumping. If dumping fees are not politically possible,
there may be no realistic alternative to free, publicly provided trash
pickup.
Recycling requirements and policies that force producers,
retailers, and customers to internalize the cost of waste disposal can
supplement trash pickup. Although the costs are borne locally and
vary among communities, efficiency could be served by uniform na-
tional packaging standards or deposit and return requirements.
Thus, the central government would set packaging standards or levy
taxes based on each product's waste content and ease of disposal.
Local communities could provide supplemental programs as long as
they did not generate illegal inteijurisdictional hauling. In areas with
high population density, it is often inefficient to dispose of waste close
to its point of origin. Thus, trash exporting would be permitted so
long as the importing municipality approved it.
IV. MIXED CASES
Many situations do not fit neatly into a single category. The
most salient mixed cases involve nature conservation, nuclear power,
and abandoned hazardous waste sites.
pollution nationally and let local communities decide for themselves how to administer their
waste collection systems subject to the caveats discussed in text.
25. See Charles E. Davis and James P. Lester, Federalism and Environmental Policy, in
James P. Lester, ed., Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence 57, 59 (Duke
U., 1989) (arguing that a uniform national policy may be the most efficient means of attacking
large-scale problems, and giving the example of illicit cross-border waste shipments resulting
from interstate regulatory differences).
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Nature conservation implicates broad environmental concerns
when it requires the preservation of the habitat of an endangered
species or land that aids in flood control, water supply, or the absorp-
tion of pollutants. In these cases the decision should not be made by
local planning bodies since they are unlikely to weigh global concerns
adequately. Small communities, however, should be able to voice
their concerns and present evidence of localized costs and benefits to
higher levels of government. Yet, moving policy making to high-level
governments risks possible "scapegoating"--making local communi-
ties bear the cost of a global policy. We need innovative techniques to
compensate hard-hit localities if conservation decisions are to be
made on ecological grounds.
The regulation of nuclear power is too complex an issue to be
dealt with adequately here. Neighbors of nuclear power plants would
be harmed most seriously by an accident, but they also benefit from
jobs at the plants. A major accident would have an impact far beyond
jurisdictional borders, but the benefits of inexpensive power are also
broad-based. Some citizens object to nuclear power on principle,
without concern for whether possible accidents will affect them
personally. At a technical level, there are only so many ways of
building a safe nuclear power plant. Centrally articulated standards
can save time and money, though fine tuning may be necessary to
accommodate local conditions. If plants are built, neighbors should be
indemnified for the excess risks that they must bear.
Abandoned hazardous waste sites pose special problems.
Here, the principal argument for federal responsibility is based on
distributive justice, not efficiency. The only efficiency claim is techno-
cratic: The central government can bring together experts to set over-
all standards for waste site cleanups more cheaply than the multitude
of local units. Distributive justice involves considerations of intergen-
erational equity. Old sites represent costs imposed on current resi-
dents by past economic activities. Although the problems of hazard-
ous waste are usually locally based, it is unfair for nearby residents to
bear the costs of cleanup. After all, locals often did not know of the
risk, and in most cases the hazardous material came from outside the
neighborhood. Why should existing residents and businesses be re-
quired to pay for cleanup to make the health prospects of residents
equal to those of others who had the good luck to be located in clean
areas? 26 Furthermore, if a local government attempts to finance
26. This issue does not arise for old sites that those purchasing land in the region knew to
be hazardous. In such situations, the danger would be incorporated in the sales price. As long
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cleanups by raising taxes, it discourages prospective businesses and
residents from locating there.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The division of regulatory authority in Germany and the
United States does not mirror accurately the political-economic con-
cerns raised above. The laws of both nations acknowledge the inter-
jurisdictional nature of many pollution problems, but the actual divi-
sion of authority contains many questionable features. Some of these
issues have implications for German and American constitutional law.
A The United States Constitution
The United States Constitution contains no detailed
assignment of responsibilities to levels of government. The Tenth
Amendment consists of a single sentence: 'The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'27
This sentence has not produced a jurisprudence of regulatory
federalism. The Supreme Court is permissive. It has invoked the
Interstate Commerce Clause28 to justify a wide range of federal
regulation even in cases where the interstate impact is indirect.29
Federal regulation of the environment seldom has raised
constitutional issues.3 Comprehensive federal statutes control air
as new owners are informed of their responsibility prior to the purchase, there is no unfairness
in requiring them to follow through. The problem is then pushed back a step to the seller who
bore the cost in the form of a reduced price.
27. U.S. Const., Amend. Y_
28. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
29. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 5-4 to 5-6 (Foundation, 2d ed.
1988). Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), states that the Supreme Court will invalidate
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause "only if it is clear that there is no rational basis
for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there
is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends." Id.
at 323-24 (citations omitted). A federal appeals court recently suggested limits to the Court's
permissive jurisprudence at least in the criminal justice area. The Fifth Circuit held unconsti-
tutional a federal law outlawing guns in the vicinity of schools. See United States v. Lopez, 2
F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (April 18, 1994). The court based its
decision on Congress's failure to mention any link to interstate commerce. Id. at 1354-55. But
see the contrary holding in United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994). The
judge in Ornelas believed that precedent required him to uphold the law, but stated in a
footnote that if he could, he would hold the law unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth
Amendment. Id. at 1093 n.11.
30. A recent attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the regulation of intrastate wet-
lands under the Clean Water Act failed. A panel of the Seventh Circuit held that the federal
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and water pollution; laws on waste, pesticides, drinking water, and
the protection of land and endangered species give the federal
government an important role in addressing these problems.31
The link between federalism and the environment recently has
been raised in three areas of constitutional law: (1) Commerce Clause
challenges to state laws that discriminate against out-of-state produc-
ers or favor in-state business; (2) disputes over the scope of state
common law remedies in the face of preemptive federal statutes in the
same field; and (3) a Tenth Amendment challenge to a statute requir-
ing states to take certain actions.
First, federal courts have invoked the Commerce Clause to
strike down state laws that impose special burdens on the disposal of
out-of-state waste or that favor in-state producers of polluting prod-
ucts. Building on an earlier case dealing with solid waste, the
Supreme Court outlawed state taxes or fees that require out-of-state
waste generators to pay higher rates. 2 Differential charges must be
linked to differences in costs of handling such waste. The Court also
held state regulations unconstitutional that required landfills to ac-
cept only locally generated waste,3 3 and that required all local waste
to be handled by local facilities.34 Waste is to be treated as any other
article of commerce.
Providing special benefits to in-state firms is also suspect un-
der the Commerce Clause. For example, a federal district court
struck down an Illinois law that favored local high-sulfur coal as an
regulation of isolated, intrastate wetlands was both contrary to the Clean Water Act and uncon-
stitutional under the Commerce Clause. Hoffman Homes v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992).
Even this panel, however, was careful to point out that it agreed with those courts that have
upheld the constitutionality of federal regulation of environmental hazards with interstate
impacts. Id. at 1317. Subsequent to this decision, the EPA requested a rehearing, the original
order was vacated, and a majority of the same panel wrote a narrow opinion holding that the
jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act did not extend to the particular property at issue. Hoffman
Homes v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). The author of the original opinion wrote a concur-
rence in which he continued to maintain that federal regulation of intrastate wetlands was
unconstitutional. Id. at 262-63 (Manion, C.J., concurring).
31. For a summary of federal environmental statutes and their implementation, see
generally Burtraw and Portney, Environmental Policy (cited in note 9) and the articles collected
in Paul R. Portney, ed., Public Policies for Environmental Protection (Resources for the Future,
1990).
32. Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envir. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992). The decisions build on City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), a case that struck down a New Jersey law
prohibiting the import of out-of-state solid waste. See also New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (holding a lower tax on Ohio-produced ethanol unconstitutional).
33. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.
Ct. 2019 (1992).
34. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
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interference with interstate commerce.35 The act was passed after the
federal Clean Air Act was amended in 1990 to remove the favorable
treatment of high-sulfur coal. The Constitution permits the federal
government to favor regional interests as it did under the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977.36 The federal district court held, however,
that states could not take protectionist actions on their own.3
Nevertheless, direct subsidies to a state's industry appear to be per-
missible, and if the state becomes a "market participant" by opening
its own landfill or disposal facility, it can do as it likes.38
Second, the status of state common law nuisance suits has
been questioned in cases challenging the preemptive power of the
federal Clean Water Act. A series of cases involving suits by the state
of Illinois against the city of Milwaukee concluded that the Clean
Water Act preempted federal and state common law actions between
parties in different states.3 9 A subsequent case found that suits
brought under the law of the discharger's state are permitted,40 but
that these suits need not be brought in the courts of the discharger's
state. Thus, a New York discharger could be sued in Vermont courts
for common law nuisance under New York law.41
The decisions in these first two categories limit the states'
ability to isolate themselves from the rest of the nation and establish
the preemptive effect of federal statutes. No case, however, explicitly
35. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The Illinois Coal
Act required public utilities to take into account "the need to use coal mined in Illinois" and "the
need to preserve as a valuable state resource the mining of coal in Illinois," when they formu-
lated their Clear Air Act compliance plans. Id. at 557. The Act also required the four largest
utilities to install devices to control sulfur dioxide emissions ("scrubbers"), a requirement that
would decrease the benefits of using low-sulfur, out-of-state coal. Id. The district court found
that the statutory language represented "pure protectionism." Id. at 559.
36. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (Yale
U., 1981) (describing the legislative dealmaking that produced a statute favoring states that
produce high sulfur coal).
37. Alliance for Clean Coal, 840 F. Supp. at 561.
38. See Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2019 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The market-participant doctrine is stated in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
809-10 (1976).
39. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee II, 451
U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
40. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
41. Id. In Ouellette, property owners who resided or leased land on the Vermont shore of
Lake Champlain filed a class action suit seeking damages in a Vermont state court against
International Paper Company, the operator of a pulp and paper mill on the New York side of the
lake. Id. at 483. The Court held that application of Vermont's common law of nuisance to a
point source in New York was preempted by the Clean Water Act because this would constitute
a severe interference with the Act's scheme. Id. at 497. However, the Court also noted that the
savings clause of the Act preserved other state actions, and allowed aggrieved parties to bring a
nuisance claim under the law of the source state, in this case New York. Id. at 499-500.
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considers the substantive division of tasks between federal and state
governments or challenges the federal government's ability to regu-
late the environment. Commerce Clause jurisprudence has not ad-
dressed interregional differences in the substance of environmental
problems, differences that may require interstate cooperation rather
than federal uniformity.
The third category does touch on the subject of interstate coop-
eration and its link to federal power. A recent case invokes the Tenth
Amendment to limit federal power.42 A federal statute required states
to form regional interstate compacts to handle the disposal of low-
level nuclear waste or to dispose of it within their own borders4 3
State officials engineered passage of the law. The original act im-
posed no sanctions on those that failed to comply. After several years
of experience with this act, the states themselves proposed that
Congress pass a tougher measure containing federally enforceable
incentives and penalties. The Supreme Court upheld the sanctions
supported by the states.44 However, the Court found a provision that
ordered uncooperative states to take title to internally generated
waste unconstitutional on federalism grounds.45 The "take title"
provision, the Court reasoned, "crossed the line distinguishing
encouragement from coercion. ''46
In his dissent, Justice White objected to the decision on the
ground that "the... Act was very much the product of cooperative
federalism, in which the States bargained among themselves to
achieve compromises for Congress to sanction."47 Justice White's
dissent would have been entirely reasonable, if true. If the states
asked to be bound by a federal statute ex ante, they should not be able
to renege ex post. A study of the Act's legislative history suggests that
Justice White's claim, though true for the other two sanctions upheld
by the Court, did not apply to the "take title" provision. According to
one study, the provision was added on the floor of the Senate on the
42. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
43. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99
Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-2021j (1988)). The Act was originally passed in
1980. In drafting both the original act and the 1985 revision, Congress relied heavily on reports
submitted by the National Governors' Association. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2415; id. at
2435-39 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427.
45. Id. at 2429.
46. Id. at 2427.
47. Id. at 2438. Justice White argued that the state of New York "should be estopped from
asserting the unconstitutionality of a provision that seeks merely to ensure that, after deriving
substantial advantages from the 1985 Act, New York in fact must live up to its bargain." Id. at
2440 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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last day of the 99th Congress. 48 It had been proposed by the Federal
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in hearings, but had not been
formally approved by either the House or the Senate committees and
was not part of the states' proposal.49 Although the Court stated that
the consent of state officials is not sufficient to lend constitutional
legitimacy to a federal law,50 the provision in question did not, in fact,
provide a sharp test of this claim.
The Supreme Court has not worked out clearly the limits of
federal and state power over environmental issues. Federal courts
seem to give state common law greater deference than state statutes,
perhaps because state statutes more explicitly favor in-state
interests.5' States cannot favor in-state over out-of-state coal
producers or waste generators, but states can provide direct subsidies,
and federal statutes can have disparate state or regional impacts.
Although coercive federal restrictions on the states are
unconstitutional, the Court has not clearly articulated the distinction
between coercive conditions and those that merely provide incentives.
B. The German Grundgesetz
In contrast to the American Constitution, the German
Grundgesetz (Constitution) creates explicit categories of federal and
state control. The allocation of responsibilities and funding between
federal and state governments varies depending on the object of regu-
lation. The Grundgesetz distinguishes between nuclear power, real
estate and housing law, waste disposal, air purification, and noise
abatement, on the one hand,52 and land distribution, regional plan-
ning, water, hunting, nature conservation, and landscape manage-
ment, on the other.53 In the first group, concurrent legislative author-
ity exists. The German states, or Ldnder, can legislate when the
federal government has not. The federal government can legislate
48. A. Marice Ashe, The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act and the Tenth
Amendment: A "Paragon of Legislative Success" or a Failure of Accountability?, 20 Ecol. L. Q.
267, 284-85 (1993).
49. Id.
50. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432. The Court's argument for this position is that the
constitutional division of authority between federal and state governments is for the protection
of individuals, not for the benefit of the states. Id.
51. While no current study supports this proposition, the Author's research into this area
indicates that federal courts provide more deference to state decisional law than to state
statutory law.
52. Grundgesetz ("GG-), Arts. 74(11a), (18), (24) (F.R.G.).
53. GG, Arts. 75(3)-(4).
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when states might be tempted to impose costs on each other," exactly
the argument made above for permitting preemptive federal statutes.
For the second group, the Grundgesetz permits federal framework
laws that give discretion to the Ldnder to fill in the legislative details
with their own statutes. 5
This constitutional distinction contains anomalies not justified
on the basis of the nature of the substantive environmental problems.
Water quality should fall into the first concurrent category. Noise
control should be in the second framework group unless
inteijurisdictional competition is thought to be a serious problem.
Similarly, nature conservation should distinguish between locally
beneficial projects and those that support the preservation of species
and biodiversity. Waste disposal is also a mixed case because it can
have local, regional, and national impact. The economic analysis of
federalism outlined above has had little impact on the constitutional
structure. The Bundestag (the German parliament) and the
Constitutional Court could use the general language of the
Grundgesetz." to make these distinctions, but so far these bodies have
not done so.
In fact, so far as the question has been raised at all in the en-
vironmental area, the judicial response has been disappointing. The
German constitution explicitly requires the federal government to
administer the federal waterways used for inland shipping.57 The
Constitutional Court held that federal jurisdiction extended only to
commerce between the German Ldnder, not to the control of water
pollution and water supply." Yet, the justification for a federal pres-
ence is the same in both situations because they both involve the costs
one Land may impose on another and on the nation as a whole.
Water pollution control is subsumed under the federal authority to
promulgate framework statutes concerning the "water regime." Such
framework laws constitute the weakest form of federal legislative
54. Under GG, Art. 72(2), the federal government has the right to legislate when:
(1) a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of individual Ldnder, or (2)
the regulation of a matter by a Land statute might prejudice the interests of other
Lfnder or of the whole body politic, or (3) the maintenance of legal or economic unity,
especially the maintenance of uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of any
one Land, necessitates such regulation.
55. For more on the constitutional provisions, see generally David P. Currie, The
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 33-101 (forthcoming U. of Chicago, 1994).
56. GG, Art. 72.
57. GG, Art. 89.
58. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1962, 15 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
("BVerfGE') 1 (F.R.G.); Judgment of Apr. 11, 1967, 21 BVerfGE 312.
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authority. 9 Weak federal authority exists despite the fact that
Germany has a number of long, heavily industrialized rivers that flow
through several Ldnder and foreign countries.
In practice, however, the anomalies are not as serious as the
constitutional text might imply. On the one hand, the waste disposal
law is more like a framework law than a detailed program of control.60
On the other hand, the federal water law is quite stringent and de-
tailed, and a separate federal statute levies taxes on dischargers.61
Although the constitutional authority is weak, the federal government
does oversee cooperative planning,62 and century-old associations of
water users control both the water quality and use of a number of
rivers.63 Furthermore, international bodies deal with German water
quality issues. For example, there is a Convention for the Protection
of the Rhine, (the Rheinschutzibereinkommen), and in 1990 Germany
and Czechoslovakia established an International Commission for the
Protection of the Elbe. 6
The Grundgesetz makes the states responsible for the day-to-
day implementation of most federal regulatory statutes. Although the
59. Constitutional amendments to give the federal government preemptive power over the
Ldnder in the area of water pollution failed to pass in 1973, 1974, and 1975. Gardner M. Brown,
Jr. and Ralph W. Johnson, Pollution Control by Effluent Charges: It Works in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Why Not in the U.S., 24 Nat. Resources J. 929, 930 (1984).
60. Abfallgesetz ("AbfG") of Aug. 27, 1986 (as amended Sept. 23, 1990).
61. Wasserhaushaltsgesetz ("WHG") of Sept. 23, 1986 (as amended Feb. 12, 1990 and Aug.
26, 1992); Abwasserabgabengesetz ("AbwAG") of Nov. 6, 1990.
62. WHG § 36-36b requires that each Land draw up both an overall plan and specific
plans for each body of water. Interstate agreements on the use and condition of water are a
reason for requiring a plan, WHG § 36b(2).2, and the federal government can use administrative
guidelines to influence the content of plans, WHG §§ 36(3) & 36b(7). See Horst Neumann,
Hans-Joachim Schultz-Wildelau, and Jan Schilling, Wasserwirtschaftliche Rahmenpldne und
Bewirtschaftungsplne (§§ 36, 36b Wasserhaushaltsgesetz) als Beitrag zum Umweltschutz in
Niedersachsen, in Werner Schenkel and Peter-Christoph Storm, eds., Umwelt: Politik, Technik,
Recht 257, 259 (Erich Schmidt, 1990) (listing the 30 general planning areas in the western part
of Germany).
63. The first such body, the Emscher Genossenschaft, was established in 1902 in response
to a discharge of dye into the Rhine. It was followed by the establishment of similar bodies on
the Wupper, Lippe, and Ruhr. The associations include riparian businesses and communities
and the water industry. Albert Weale, Vorsprung durch Technik? The Politics of German
Environmental Regulation, in Kenneth Dyson, ed., The Politics of German Regulation 159, 162
(Dartmouth U., 1992).
64. Umweltbundesamt, Jahresbericht 1990 at 254 (Umweltbundesamt, 1991). With the
breakup of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are now Germany's partners along
with the European Union. 1990 Convention on the International Commission for the Protection
of the Elbe, Intl Envir. Rep. (BNA) reference file 35:0451 (Oct. 8, 1990). There are also specific
conventions for the Rhine which include the European Union as a signatory. Convention on the
Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, 16 I.L.M. 242 (Dec. 3, 1976); Convention on
the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, 16 I.L.M. 265 (Dec. 3, 1976). The
Elbe is much more polluted than the Rhine. For a comparison of the two rivers in 1990, see
Umwelt 407 (Oct. 1993).
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federal government can exercise some control over the Lander, there
is no possibility of direct federal administration in the environmental
area.65 This institutional structure gives the Ldnder considerable
freedom to shape federal requirements to fit their priorities. In the
United States the states also are heavily involved in the administra-
tion of federal environmental laws. Nevertheless, states may choose
not to become involved, and, conversely, the federal government can
judge a state to be incapable of effective administration and can fed-
eralize administration of the program in that state. Some view this
freedom to refuse involvement as a cornerstone of American federal-
ism that enhances state power. The German situation casts doubt on
this claim. The German Lnder are powerful precisely because the
federal government has no choice except to implement its statutes
through the states.
The German federal government faces constitutional limits on
its authority to make grants to the states. The Grundgesetz estab-
lishes overall conditions for allocating revenue that take account of
interstate differences in fiscal resources.66 The Constitutional Court
ruled in the mid-1970s that imposing conditions on federal grants
would violate the freedom of federation members.67 More recently, the
Constitutional Court held that a federal law apportioning revenues
from corporate and wage taxes had not adequately considered vari-
ations in the tax bases of state governments. 68 These tax receipts,
which constitute an important revenue source for state governments,
become part of each state's general fund. In a reunited Germany, the
old formulas inadequately reflect the diverse situations of the Ldnder.
As interpreted by the Constitutional Court in the cases cited above,
65. GG, Arts. 83-85. Article 83 states that "the Ldnder shall execute federal statutes as
matters of their own concern insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise provide or permit."
Article 87 lists matters for direct federal administration. The environment is not on the list,
although Article 87(3) provides for the creation of federal authorities "in case of urgent need"
with the consent of the legislative bodies.
66. GG, Arts. 104a, 106, 107.
67. Judgment of Mar. 14, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 96; Judgment of Feb. 10, 1976, 41 BVerfGE
291. See also Philip Blair, Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality: The Record of the
Federal Constitutional Court, in Charlie Jeffery and Peter Savigear, eds., German Federalism
Today 63, 78-79 (St. Martin's, 1991); Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany at 83-84 & nn.126-32 (cited in note 55).
68. Judgment of June 24, 1986, 72 BVerfGE 330; Blair, Political Reality in Jeffery and
Sarigear, eds., German Federalism Today at 79-81; Currie, The Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany at 84-86 & nn.133-42; Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 100 (Duke U., 1989). See generally Wolfgang
Renzsch, F6derale Finanzbeziehungen im Parteienstaat. Eine Fallstudie zum Verlust politischer
Handlungsm6glichkeiten, 3 Zeitschrift fiar Parlamentsfragen 331 (1989) (describing the political
wrangling which produced the unconstitutional allocation).
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the fiscal constitution, which is based on revenue-sharing principles,
limits the scope of federal grants earmarked for specific purposes,
such as the cleanup of old dumps.69
The current debate over the German constitution has done
little to advance the discussion of German federalism. While some
argue that environmental protection should be included in the
Grundgesetz as a goal of the German state, many combine this posi-
tion with support for further delegation of authority to state and local
governments. 70 There appears to be little recognition of the tension
between the solution of large-scale environmental problems and the
parochial concerns of small-scale governments. That tension is cur-
rently blurred because of the presence of the Green Party in two Land
coalition governments and eleven of sixteen state parliaments at a
time when the party is weak nationally.71 Environmentalists who
support greater decentralization may be extrapolating too easily from
the current situation in which the Lander appear, on balance, greener
than the federal government. These advocates are looking at political
configurations without considering the underlying nature of the sub-
stantive problems. In an interdependent Europe additional delega-
tion of environmental responsibilities to the Lander seems ill-advised.
VI. LocAL CONTROLS OVER REGIONAL PROBLEMS
The environmental policies of Germany and the United States
often ignore the regional character of pollution. The scope of the
problem and the jurisdictional level at which solutions are developed
are mismatched. Pollution with regional and national impact is
frequently regulated by state and local officials, who have no incentive
69. Nevertheless, by the end of 1992 the federal government had spent DM 1.6 billion
(about $1 billion) for 1,800 special environmental protection projects in the east. According to
the Environmental Ministry, the environmental situation is improving in the east both because
of the shutdown of old heavily polluting factories and because of new investment.
Umweltsituation in den neuen Ldndern spiZrbar verbessert, Umwelt 474-75 (Dec. 1993).
In addition to direct subsidies, the federal government provides tax benefits and borrowing
subsidies throughout the country to encourage energy efficiency and environmental protection.
See Michael Kl6pfer, Umweltrecht 167-75 (C.H. Beck, 1989). See generally Helmut Weidner,
Air Pollution Control Strategies and Policies in the Federal Republic of Germany
(Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin ffir Sozialforschung, 1986).
70. Friedrich Adolf Jahn MdB, CDU/CSU, Keine Totalrevision des Grundgesetzes; Detlef
Kleinert MdB, FDP, Als verldfliche Grundlage anerkennen; Hans-Jochen Vogel MdB, SPD, Vom
Grundgesetz der alten Bundesrepublik zur Verfassung der neuen Bundesrepublik, Das
Parlament 13 (Apr. 10, 1992).
71. The states of Bremen and Hesse have Greens in their governing coalitions. Federal
Republic of Germany, Demokratie im Schaubild 29 (Transcontact, 1994).
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to look outside their own jurisdiction. Even when a national statute
guides lower-level enforcement, implementation by state and local
officials may ignore the policy's broader impact. Conversely, federal
statutes can be overly rigid and insensitive to differing state and local
conditions. Both countries experience both problems, but over-
delegation is especially prevalent in Germany, and excessive rigidity
is widespread in the United States.
In Germany, relatively weak federal control of implementation
makes the problem of cross-border effects especially serious. Land
officials have considerable discretion in setting enforcement priori-
ties.72 Even when a strong federal role is justified, implementation is
largely left to the states and localities. The possibilities for exceptions
favoring local business are great even when environmental harms
cross jurisdictional borders.
Local control is especially notable in implementing air pollu-
tion policy in which the federal law is vague and state governments
have failed to promulgate clear enforcement guidelines. 73 According
to one study, this situation led to numerous cases of special treatment
and exceptions in the 1970s when state governments implemented the
law.74  While central government guidelines and regulations
strengthened air pollution requirements in the 1980s, case-by-case
licensing processes remain open to local influence. Water pollution
policy is better organized at the state level, but the value of subsidies
for water pollution control does not necessarily reflect the costs of
pollution.75
The German emphasis on licensing in both water and air pol-
lution control combines with federalism to encourage a case-by-case
approach. While ambient conditions are supposed to play a role in the
licensing process, state and local officials lack strong incentives to
look outside their own borders. The federal government has issued
72. Uwe Leonardy, The Working Relationships Between Bund and Lnder in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in Jeffery and Savigear, eds., German Federalism Today 40, 53-54 (cited
in note 67); Gary Davis and Joanne Linnerooth, Government Ownership of Risk: Guaranteeing
a Treatment Infrastructure, in Bruce W. Piasecki and Gary A. Davis, eds., America's Future in
Toxic Waste Management: Lessons from Europe 95, 97-99 (Quorum, 1987).
73. BundesImmissionsschutzgesetz ("BImSchG") of May 14, 1990.
74. Renate Mayntz, Intergovernmental Implementation of Environmental Policy, in
Kenneth Hanf and Fritz W. Scharpf, eds., Interorganizational Policymaking: Limits to
Coordination and Central Control 201, 204-05 (Sage Publications, 1978).
75. Mayntz, Intergovernmental Implementation in Hanf and Scharpf, eds.,
Interorganizational Policymaking at 205. For example, Baden-Wfirttemberg's efforts to clean up
Lake Constance involved subsidies for sewage treatment that favored the construction of small
inefficient plants. Fritz W. Scharpf, Bernd Reissert, and Fritz Schnabel, Policy Effectiveness
and Conflict Avoidance in Intergovernmental Policy Formation, in Hanf and Scharpf, eds.,
Interorganizational Policymaking 57, 78-83.
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technical guidelines that have presumptive force covering air pollu-
tion, noise, and solid waste.7 6 This practice can counteract local incen-
tives to be overly lenient or excessively strict, but it does not result in
cost-efficient policies. The guidelines may lead state and local offi-
cials to be tough, but that is quite different from considering the sys-
temic impact of decisions on national and international environmental
quality.
In the past German observers have argued that an
"implementation deficit" exists in environmental law. 7  This deficit
may have resulted from the attempts of individual Ldnder to benefit
economically at the expense of others. At present that criticism is
blunted by the existence of the Green Party as a coalition partner in
some state and local governments. Some observers now claim that
enforcement is too vigorous in some Ldnder.7 8 Whatever the bias, it is
in any case inconsistent.
Federal control is stronger in the United States, and regional
offices of the Environmental Protection Agency play a central role29
Nevertheless, state implementation creates problems of inconsistent
76. For a discussion of their promulgation, see Rose-Ackerman, Controlling
Environmental Policy ch. 4 (cited in note *). See also Fritz Ossenbiihl, Autonome Rechtsetzung
der Verwaltung, in J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof, eds., 3 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der
Bundesrepublik 425, 429-30, 457-59 (C.F. Mfiller, 1988).
77. See Eckard Rehbinder, Controlling the Environmental Enforcement Deficit: West
Germany, 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 373, 373-75 (1976). Not surprisingly, the Linder officially
rejected the notion of a deficit in enforcement. According to Rehbinder, however, "many Land
officials, in particular those on the lower administrative levels, privately admit the existence of
the enforcement deficit." Id. at 374. Ronald Brickman, Sheila Jasanoff, and Thomas Ilgen claim
that the Ldnder vary widely in the resources they commit to the enforcement of the chemical
control law. Ronald Brickman, Sheila Jasanoff, and Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The
Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States 49-50 (Cornell U., 1985). Sonja Boehmer-
Christiansen and Jim Skea claim that similar variability exists in the state licensing of
industrial plants under federal air pollution laws. Soinja Boehmer-Christiansen and Jim Skea,
Acid Politics: Environmental and Energy Policies in Britain and Germany 178 (Bellhaven,
1991). Gertrude Lfibbe-Wolff claims that although building projects are seldom begun without
the requisite permits under the law controlling noise and pollution, water permits are not
always issued when required by law and, if issued, are not well enforced. Gertrude Lfibbe-
Wolff, Das Kooperationsprinzip im Umweltrecht-Rechtsgrundsatz oder Deckmantal des
Vollzugsdefizits?, in Arthur Benz and Wolfgang Seibel, eds., Zwischen Cooperation und
Korruption: Abweichendes Verhalten in der Verwaltung 209, 223 (Nomos, 1992).
78. The existence of this public perception is reported in letters to the Author from Prof.
Dr. Philip Kunig, Faculty of Law, Free University of Berlin (June 4, 1993) and Prof. Dr. Fritz W.
Scharpf, Max Plank Institute for Social Research, Cologne, Germany (June 1, 1993) (both on file
with the Author).
79. For a comparison of Germany and the United States in the field of air pollution see
generally Eberhard Bohne, Politics and Markets in Environmental Protection: Reforming Air
Pollution Regulation in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany,
Report to the German Marshall Fund of the United States (draft, Aug. 1987) (on file with the
Author).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
policies across the country and risks underregulation of pollution.8°
For example, the focus on state implementation plans under the
American Clean Air Act invites state officials to take a parochial view.
While the 1990 amendments put more emphasis on the control of
pollutants that cross state boundaries, it remains to be seen if the
new provisions are sufficient. A pre-1990 study of the administration
of the Clean Air Act found that lower-level governments and federal
district courts flexibly administered stringent federal regulations.81
The centralized nature of federal policy making produced strains
lower down the government ladder in which disproportionate costs
were sometimes imposed on individual dischargers. These problems
were resolved ad hoc, often to avoid the shutdown of an important em-
ployer.
In the past, the Clean Water Act provided federal matching
funds to state and local governments for water pollution projects.82
Such matching grants could have been designed to induce local gov-
ernments to account for the costs that their sewage imposes on down-
stream communities. The federal government could have provided a
larger subsidy to those communities that imposed more costs out of
state. In practice, matching rates never bore any relation to the
degree to which costs were externalized.83 Studies of the location and
effectiveness of sewage treatment plants suggest that efficient
improvements in water quality seldom determined where and when
subsidized plants were built. The days of large-scale grants for
sewage treatment plant construction are over, but current policy has
not corrected these deficiencies.84
In Germany, too much decentralization has led the federal
government to try to induce lower-level licensing authorities to im-
pose high standards. Unable to enforce strong regional plans effec-
tively, especially for air pollution, federal authorities must rely on
technical standards to guide these licensing activities. Even the sub-
80. For a general discussion of the impact of American federalism on air and water pollu-
tion policy, see William R. Lowry, The Dimensions of Federalism: State Governments and
Pollution Control Policies (Duke U., 1992).
81. R.S. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act 193-238
(Brookings Inst., 1983).
82. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
83. Id.
84. The matching grant program is being replaced with a revolving loan program. A.
Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in Paul R. Portney, ed., Public Policies for
Environmental Protection 97, 134-40 (Resources for the Future, 1990). See Grant-to-Loan
Transitions in Water Act Heralds New State, EPA Roles, Quigley Says, 17 Envir. Rep. (BNA)
1780 (Feb. 20, 1987) (noting 20% state or local matching for construction loans for municipal
sewage treatment works).
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sidies provided by federal revenue sharing and tax benefits are sub-
ject to the implementation priorities of lower-level governments. 85 In
contrast, too much centralization in the United States has produced
stringent, legally binding regulations for new air pollution sources
and industries that pollute the water.85 These uniform rules often are
poorly adapted to individual air basins and watersheds, and the ex-
ceptions to them, permitted by state officials and federal courts, are
unlikely to reflect the differential cost-benefit tradeoffs.87
VII. HAZARDOUS WASTE AND RECYCLING
Even if the environmental issue is locally based, too much
authority in the hands of state and local governments can generate
destructive competition and serious inequities. Hazardous waste
policy in Germany provides an instructive contrast to the American
regulatory structure; United States policy is criticized for excessive
rigidity, and the German solution is too decentralized. German recy-
cling policy, in contrast, is too heavily controlled by the federal gov-
ernment.
Destructive interstate competition among the American states
is a well-recognized problem. It has been discussed extensively in the
context of state business taxes and investment aids; the same princi-
ples apply to environmental policy as well.8 One of the ironies of the
Reagan Administration's efforts to devolve regulatory authority to the
states was the occasional opposition of state officials. For example,
governors welcomed devolution of regulatory authority from the
Environmental Protection Agency, but argued that "successful delega-
tion of programs can only be accomplished with strong technical and
financial assistance from EPA, a national presence of EPA in stan-
dards' setting and resolving interstate pollution problems, and strong
85. Graham Bennett and Konrad von Moltke describe the importance of subsidies and tax
benefits in administering pollution policy in Hamburg. See Graham Bennett and Konrad von
Moltke, Integrated Permitting in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, in Nigel
Haigh and Frances Irwin, eds., Integrated Pollution Control in Europe and North America 105,
128 (Conservation Found., 1990).
86. The Clean Air Act permits interstate differences in air quality plans subject to federal
guidelines, but these differences are tied to state boundaries, not air basins. 42 U.S.C. §
7410(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (requiring each state to develop and submit a plan to the
EPA).
87. Charles Davis and James Lester document interstate differences in dependence on
federal funds and commitment to environmental protection as a policy goal. Davis and Lester,
Federalism and Environmental Policy in Lester, ed., Environmental Politics and Policy at 71-83
(cited in note 25).
88. Id. at 62.
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federal research."89 These officials recognized the benefits of avoiding
destructive interstate competition by using a strong, federal presence
to tie their hands.
This idea is a basic principle behind the federal Superfund law
mandating the cleanup of existing hazardous waste sites.90
Superfund-financed by a special national tax on waste produc-
ers-pays for cleanup if the responsible parties cannot be found.91
Waste sites usually affect only nearby residents, making a strong fed-
eral role seem unjustified. Nevertheless, any state that implemented
a vigorous cleanup program would burden its own taxpayers and
induce potentially liable firms to relocate. Thus, few states act on
their own. Federal intervention is also justified on distributive justice
grounds. Because of these considerations, one cannot reform the
much-criticized federal law by arguing for devolution to lower levels of
government. Criticism must instead focus on the design of the stat-
ute.
An alternative to the cumbersome Superfund process would be
a law placing liability on waste producers, but leaving local communi-
ties the authority to decide whether to engage in cleanup or spend the
proceeds in some other manner. One could retain the current
Superfund, under which the federal government provides backup
funding if the waste producers cannot be found or are unable to pay.
In other words, the federal government would establish the basic
right to compensation and let local communities decide how to balance
the reduction of health risks against other funding priorities. 92 Such a
89. National Governors' Association, Environmental Subcommittee, Report of Work Group
on Delegation and Oversight (Dec. 1982).
90. Burtraw and Portney, Environmental Policy in Helm, ed., Economic Policy Towards
the Environment at 307-08 (cited in note 5); Roger C. Dower, Hazardous Wastes, in Portney, ed.,
Public Policies for Environmental Protection at 151, 168-77 (cited in note 84). The formal name
of the act is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA").
91. Dower, Hazardous Wastes in Portney, ed., Public Policies for Environmental Protection
at 169-70. Government seeks to collect cleanup costs and the value of damages to natural
resources from those waste producers who used a particular site. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1991). The
program is very expensive. The cumulative authorized commitment of federal tax dollars is
$15.2 billion and estimates of total costs range from $100 billion to $1.7 trillion. Thomas
Church and Robert T. Nakamura, Cleaning Up the Mess: Implementation Strategies in
Superfund 3 (Brookings Inst., 1993). The search for responsible parties and the conflicts
between them over liability have slowed cleanup efforts and produced a heavy judicial caseload
as "potentially responsible parities" sue each other. Id. at 7, 24-28. The executive branch, not
the courts, sets standards for damage assessment. See State of Ohio v. United States Dep't of
the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reviewing the regulations for damage
assessment and finding fault with some aspects).
92. Under such a system one would need to determine the proper amount of compensation
based on the health risks and other costs of the waste site. The major argument against such a
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program would limit the federal government's role to restraining
interstate competition and equalizing state and local financial
capacities. Because the risks are local, addressing the problems posed
by them would be a local choice.
Germany has no federal equivalent of Superfund, and its liabil-
ity law makes it difficult to extract cleanup funds from those who
generated waste in the past.93 The federal law permits municipal
waste treatment facilities to reject hazardous waste, but does not
mandate a solution to the problems of disposal and the cleanup of old
dump sites.94 Cooperative industry-government cleanup efforts occur
for sites currently in use or for those being prepared for future devel-
opment.95 The institutional structure is more complex regarding old
sites. Land owners or past operators of waste disposal facilities can
be held strictly liable for cleanup costs. However, those who
generated the waste and new owners who lack knowledge of the site's
characteristics escape liability.96 Thus, frequently no one with the
requisite funds can be held legally responsible for the cleanup. In
response, some Linder levy taxes to generate cleanup funds. The
locally based system is the political reality of local government decision making. Those harmed
by the site may not be involved in making the choice, and if the damages are paid to local
governments, those harmed may not receive compensation for their injuries.
93. The 1991 Environmental Liability Law does not extend liability to waste generators
and transporters, and it has only prospective application. Ordinary tort law imposes liability
only if the waste generator can be identified. Thomas W. Church and Robert T. Nakamura,
Cooperative and Adversary Regimes in Environmental Policy: Hazardous Waste Cleanup in
Europe and the United States, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs, State University of New
York at Albany 25-29 (draft manuscript, June 19, 1994) (on file with the Author). Generators,
however, could be liable if they are negligent in the selection of a waste transporter or waste
disposal facility operator. A soil pollution act also is in the drafting stage. Letter to the Author
from Prof. Dr. Eckard Rehbinder, Faculty of Law, J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main,
Germany (June 7, 1993) (on file with the Author).
94. Abfallgesetz ("AbfG") of Aug. 27, 1986, §§ 9, 10, 11 (as amended Sept. 23, 1990).
95. Church and Nakamura, Cooperative and Adversary Regimes at 22-29 (cited in note
93). The states with the most active programs are Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Baden-Wfirttemberg, and Bavaria. Id. at 24. In the new eastern Lander, the federal
government will bear much of the cost of cleanup because the states are too poor to finance it
themselves and because the federal government holds the title to military facilities and formerly
state-owned plants, both of which accounted for much of the hazardous waste produced in East
Germany. The cleanup in the east will be costly. Prior to unification, much of western Europe
shipped waste to East Germany for disposal. According to a Greenpeace report, 400,000 tons of
hazardous waste per year were shipped to depositories in East Germany along with large
quantities of other kinds of waste. Andreas Bernstoff, Millkolonie DDR, Natur 10 (Jan. 1990).
96. AbfG §§ 9, 10, 11(1). The statute only states that the authorities can impose
regulations on existing waste management facilities and can prohibit their operation if that is
the only way of avoiding "considerable impairment of the public interest." AbfG § 9.
Furthermore, the public authorities can supervise abandoned waste management facilities and
other old sites where waste has been generated, treated, stored, or deposited if this is necessary
to protect the public interest. AbfG § 11(1). There is no mention of liability for those connected
with such sites.
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State of Hesse, for example, charges a fee to current generators of
hazardous waste; the state uses these fees to clean up old sites. 97
The decentralized nature of German hazardous waste policy
permits states to make different judgments about the importance of
tackling the problems of both old waste sites and newly generated
waste. Subject to federal minimum standards, each Land can balance
the costs and benefits in its own way. This structure appears desir-
able given the local nature of the benefits; however, decentralization
creates inequities among the Ldnder that the more centralized
American process avoids. Some observers claim that state authorities
form coalitions with waste producers that overlook the interests of
ordinary citizens. 98 Waste producers have bargaining power because
they can threaten to leave the state or cutback on expansion plans.
Although the threat of exit may be a problem in some Ldnder, it does
not seem to bd the major disadvantage of German policy. Inequity
appears to be a more serious problem. Rich states can collect cleanup
funds from individuals and generators more easily than poor ones
with little industrial base and many waste sites.9 9 Interregional
inequities have become more acute with reunification. Before 1989,
much western waste was dumped in East Germany. The new eastern
Linder now contain this waste but have no wealthy producers to
finance a cleanup.
Recognizing this problem, the federal government has sought
ways around the constitutional limits on earmarked grants to the
97. The cleanup will be managed by a specially created private law corporation, the
Hessische Industriemaill GmbH, owned 27% by Hesse and 73% by the generators. This corpo-
ration also disposes of current wastes with the costs covered by fees levied on dischargers.
Interview with Prof. Dr. Michael Bothe, Faculty of Law, J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt am
Main, Germany (July 7, 1993). Gary Davis and Joanne Linnerooth report that at the time of
their study, Hesse heavily subsidized this corporation. Davis and Linnerooth, Government
Ownership of Risk in Piasecki and Davis, ed., America's Future at 103-06 (cited in note 72). See
also Church and Nakamura, Cooperative and Adversary Regimes at 24-25 (cited in note 93).
98. Erhard Blankenburg, The Waning of Legality in the Concept of Policy Implementation,
7 L. & Policy 481, 484-85 (1985). Blankenburg's remarks build on a detailed series of case
studies performed by Jochen Hucke, Axel Muller, and Peter Wassen, Implementation
kommunaler Umweltpolitik (Campus, 1980). Blankenburg reports that, for waste disposal in
general, local authorities tend to be stricter when industrial waste problems are small and more
lenient when they are large. He recognizes that uniform federal standards might be
undesirable, but he fails to notice that a policy of poorly enforced strict standards is unlikely to
produce the optimal amount and type of variability in treatment levels and discharges.
Blankenburg, 7 L. & Policy at 484-85.
99. Gary Davis and Joanne Linnerooth describe how the wealthy Llnder of Hesse and
Bavaria subsidize hazardous waste management activities from general public funds and also
charge the companies that generate waste. Davis and Linnerooth, Government Ownership of
Risk in Piasecki and Davis, eds., America's Future at 101-06 (cited in note 72).
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Ldnder.100 Thus far, the response has been ad hoc. The federal gov-
ernment has financed cleanup programs through the
Treuhandanstalt, which is organizing the privatization of the east.'0'
But this initiative is only a stop-gap because the Treuhand has many
other concerns and is a transitional agency. Clearly, Germany needs
to find ways to avoid the severe distributive inequities produced by
the combination of its federal structure and a liability system that
relieves past waste generators of responsibility.
German recycling policy presents a different type of problem.
Germany is putting highly restrictive packaging regulations into place
throughout the country. The regulations impose a stringent set of
collection and recycling requirements.02 An ordinance requires both
packaging manufacturers and product distributors to take back and
recycle transport packaging materials. In practice, this means that
firms must arrange for the transport packaging to be reused or
recycled. It is not necessary to ship the empty packages back to the
producer.1' 3  Product distributors are required either to accept
returned primary packaging or to participate in a privately-financed
system that collects packaging from households.04 The ordinance
includes quotas, which rise over time, on the amount of packaging
collected and on the percentage recycled. 05 Choosing the second
option, German industry established a private company called Duales
System Deutschland ("DSD") that has been given the exclusive right
to collect and recycle products marked with a "Griine Punkt" (green
dot) symbol. It operates in ninety-five percent of German cities and
100. GG, Arts. 104a, 106, 107; 39 BVerfGE 96 (1975); 41 BVerfGE 291 (1976); 72 BVerfGE
330(1986).
101. See Dr. Bertram Wieczorek, Ziele der Bundesregierung zur Erfassung, Sicherung und
Sanierung von Altlasten in den neuen Bundeslcndern, Umwelt 139 (Apr. 1993). The federal
government, acting through the Treuhandanstalt, provides 60-75% of the funding. The
remainder is provided by the Linder.
102. Verpackungsverordnung (Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste) of June 12,
1991 ("VerpackVO"). For an excellent general overview and evaluation of the ordinance, see
generally Bette K. Fishbein, Germany, Garbage, and the Green Dot: Challenging the
Throwaway Society (INFORM, 1994) ("Green Dot").
103. VerpackVO, Art. 4; Fishbein, Green Dot at 33-41.
104. VerpackVO, Art. 6; Fishbein, Green Dot at 48-81. In addition, VerpackVO Arts. 7-9
require sellers to accept the return of and charge deposits on most drinks, packaging, and
packaging of washing and cleaning agents and emulsion paints. Fishbein, Green Dot at 82-98.
105. VerpackVO, Annex to Art. 6, 1 3; Recycling Germany: A Wall of Waste, Economist 75
(Nov. 30, 1991); Abolishing Litter, Economist 59 (Aug. 22, 1992); Rfidiger Jungbluth, Ein Schritt
zur Millvermeidung, Der Tagesspiegel 35 (Dec. 1, 1991). By July 1, 1995, 80% of packaging
waste must be collected. Under its original provisions, the law requires not only collection, but
sorting for recycling and reuse. Of the waste collected, 90% of glass and metal must be recycled
and 80% of some plastics and paper by July 1, 1995. Germany is also considering a statute to
require manufacturers to take back discarded products as well as packaging. Fishbein, Green
Dot at 131-51.
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districts and is financed by fees paid by companies who place the
green dot on their products. 106
The system is reducing the tonnage of packaging materials. 107
It has come under attack, however, because of the DSD's monopoly
power and the expense and rigidity of the program.08 Despite its
monopoly status, the DSD has been a money loser that several large
companies bailed out of in the summer of 1993.109 In addition to
alleged management problems, there are two main reasons for this
shortfall. First, many companies use the green dot without paying,
and second, consumers have an incentive to use the DSD bins for
nonpackaging waste since the DSD system is free and most
municipalities charge for waste collection.110 Monopoly complaints
come from both small recyclers that accuse the DSD of overcharging
for waste and from those who accuse the firm of inefficient waste
collection practices."' Much of the waste collected has been exported
to other countries, and critics charge that the nation is not meeting its
recycling targets."12 The DSD collected more plastic than expected
and large quantities have piled up in storage areas."3 The Federal
Environmental Minister is seeking to reduce the quotas for recycling
and to make other changes in the regulation." 4
The program is both too centralized and too decentralized. The
law inefficiently limits the disposal and recycling choices of Ldnder
and manufacturers, yet fails to impose uniform federal packaging
standards in situations in which they would cut costs. 15
Nevertheless, the underlying "polluter pays" principle is sound.
106. Fishbein, Green Dot at 49-81; Araine Genilard, Falling Victim to Its Own
Success-Germany's Recycling Scheme is Under Attack from Both Industry and
Environmentalists, Financial Times 16 (Jan. 27, 1993).
107. In 1992, packaging materials fell by half a million tons, or 3.1% from the previous
year. Trendwende beim Packmitteleinsatz, Umwelt 364 (Sept. 1993).
108. Fritz Vorholz, Punkte gegen die Umwelt, Die Zeit 8 (Jan. 14, 1994); Genillard,
Financial Times at 16 (cited in note 106); Fishbein, Green Dot at 113-30 (cited in note 102).
109. Vorholz, Die Zeit at 8; Fishbein, Green Dot at 59-60, 197-200.
110. Fishbein, Green Dot at 60.
111. Genillard, Financial Times at 16 (cited in note 106); T6pfers Entwurf fur neue
Verpackungsverordnung, Handelsblatt 1 (Dec. 29, 1993).
112. Genillard, Financial Times at 16. The Environmental Ministry admits that a problem
exists for the recycling of plastic. Trendwende, Umwelt at 364 (cited in note 107).
113. Fishbein, Green Dot at 199-200 (cited in note 102).
114. Tbpfers Entwurf, Handelsblatt at 1 (cited in note 111); Fishbein, Green Dot at 200-01.
115. For example, one of the main problems with plastics recycling is that some kinds of
plastic cannot be combined. Federal standards for plastics could solve this incompatibility. As
yet, Germany (like the United States) has no such regulations. Letter to the Author from Prof.
Dr. Gerd Winter, Faculty of Law, University of Bremen (July 29, 1993) (on file with the Author).
Bette Fishbein mentions the special problems of Polyvinyl Chloride. Fishbein, Green Dot at
107-09.
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Manufacturers should take into account the disposal and recycling
costs of packaging materials and products. The German ordinance,
however, assumes that recycling and refilling is desirable without
adequately considering the monetary and environmental costs of
alternatives."1 It rules out a whole range of potentially cost-effective
alternatives for waste collection. The quotas in the law appear to
bear little relation to the relative benefits of recycling versus other
methods of disposal. This overriding weakness in the ordinance, more
than the particular failures of implementation, has left Germany with
a system that, in spite of the central role of private business, cannot
be described as a successful merger of environmental goals and
economic incentives.17
VIII. RESPONDING TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS
Both Germany and the United States recognize the global
nature of ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere, global warming,
and biodiversity. Ozone depletion has proved easiest to resolve, and
an international protocol with some bite promises to ameliorate the
problem." 8 New evidence on the existence of an ozone hole over the
northern temperate zone spurred Germany, the European Union, and
the United States to announce faster schedules to eliminate ozone-
116. Studies of the relative costs and benefits of one-way versus refillable bottles are
inconclusive. Fishbein, Green Dot at 84-85.
117. Within the constraints imposed by the law, however, the DSD has rationalized its
pricing structure. In 1993 it changed its fees to reflect the relative (average) costs of collecting
and sorting various materials. It also shifted from fees based on package volume to fees based
on weight because it believed that weight was a better proxy for its own costs. For example, the
new fees are DM 3 per kilogram for plastic and DM 0.16 per kilogram for glass, rates which
translate into DM 0.087 per liter for a plastic beverage container, compared with DM 0.058 for a
one-liter glass bottle. These fees, however, take no account of the costs of recycling beyond the
collecting and sorting costs of the DSD. Fishbein, Green Dot at 61-65.
118. The agreement, called the Montreal Protocol, was signed in September 1987 by 25
participants, including the United States and Germany. Fifty-six countries signed the London
Amendments to the Protocol in June 1990. The original document required a 50% reduction in
the consumption and production of chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") by 1999. The 1990
Amendments speed up that timetable and contain provisions designed to aid poorer countries in
reducing CFCs and other ozone depleting chemicals. Gallagher, 14 Houston J. Intl L. at 283-
305 (cited in note 4); Glenn B. Raiczyk, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer: Conference Calling for Accelerated Phase-Out of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals is Planned
for 1992, 5 Temple Intl & Comp. L. J. 363, 369-73 (1992).
Of course, in this field, as in others, there is considerable disagreement among experts about
the seriousness of the problem. Despite several large-scale research projects, doubt remains
about the contribution of chlorofluorocarbons to the thinning of the ozone layer and about the
link between a damaged ozone layer and skin cancer and other harms. McInnis, Ozone Layers
in Greve and Smith, eds., Environmental Politics at 131-35 (cited in note 6).
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depleting chemicals," 9 and led to the amendment of the international
protocol in late 1992.120 The American chemical industry supported
the original protocol because unilateral American restrictions on the
use of these chemicals had hurt their competitiveness. Thus, the
industry wanted global restrictions imposed to level the playing
field.121 The case is an example of how national regulation of a global
problem, while ineffective as a long-term strategy, can turn opponents
of regulation into political allies.122
The problems of global warming and biodiversity are proving
more difficult to resolve. Both are plagued by vexing empirical prob-
lems that complicate the policy debate. While global warming is a
relatively well-defined phenomenon, biodiversity is a catchword for a
119. Evidence that ozone depletion was occurring not only at the poles, but also over the
central regions of the earth was reported by the United States National Aeronautics and Space
Administration in both 1991 and 1992. Gallagher, 14 Houston J. Int'l L. at 277; Raiczyk, 5
Temple Int'l & Comp. L. J. at 367. The United Nations reported on ozone depletion in October
1991. Stratospheric Ozone Hole Found to Occur in Mid-Hemisphere, New Information Shows,
14 Int'l Envir. Rep. (BNA) 590 (Nov. 6, 1991). Faster timetables were announced by the United
States in February 1992 and proposed by the European Commission in March 1992. The 1992
European Community proposal is compared with earlier standards and the amended Montreal
Protocol in R. Andreas Kraemer, Implementation of the Montreal Protocol in Industrialised
Countries, Envir. L. Network Intl Newsl. 11, 13 (Feb. 1992). See also Raiczyk, 5 Temple Intl &
Comp. L. J. at 373-74; Keith Schneider, Bush Orders End to Ozone Destroyers by 1996, N.Y.
Times A18 (Feb. 12, 1992); Hole-Stoppers: CFCs Will Be Phased Out Faster Than Once
Expected, But This May Be Costly, Economist 76 (Mar. 7, 1992).
In May 1991, GCrmany promulgated a regulation prohibiting certain ozone-depleting
halogenated hydrocarbons (FCKW-Halon-Verbots-Verordnung). The ordinance goes beyond the
Montreal Protocol and EC regulations. If the ordinance is enforced, Germany will stop using
fully halogenated CFCs and halons by 1995. German Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Environmental Protection in Germany: National Report of the Federal Republic of Germany for
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992 in Brazil 136
(1992); Raiczyk, 5 Temple Int'l & Comp. L. J. at 375.
120. Kraemer, Envir. L. Network Intl Newsl. at 12; Bronwen Maddox, Ozone Hole Rescue
Moves Lead to a Tussle, Financial Times 6 (Nov. 23, 1992); A Quick Fix on Ozone, Economist 50
(Nov. 28, 1992). The 93 nations meeting in Copenhagen in November 1992 agreed to set up a
fund to help poor countries, to tighten the timetable to phase out chlorofluorocarbons, and to
add two new substances to the restricted list.
121. McInnis, Ozone Layers in Greve and Smith, eds., Environmental Politics at 141-44
(cited in note 6). Daniel McInnis demonstrates that the American chemical industry would have
earned substantial oligopoly profits under the original protocol's restrictions on production
because they had a head start on the development of substitutes. Id. at 147-49. However,
subsequent amendments that speeded up the timetables cut these gains. Id. at 149-50.
122. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a
Federal Republic, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 152 (1981) (discussing this phenomenon). In the American
federal system, where states have substantial independent regulatory authority, the regulation
of automobile exhaust followed this pattern. California passed a law stringently regulating
automobile exhaust. As a consequence, the automobile industry began to support preemptive
federal legislation. Similar to the case of CFCs, however, the subsequent federal law was so
strict as to cast doubt on the wisdom of the industry's strategy. For an analysis of this case, see
generally E. Donald Elliott, Bruce Ackerman, and John Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 313 (1985).
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range of concerns, from the preservation of appealing individual spe-
cies to the management of threatened ecosystems. Furthermore, even
if the scientific disagreements over the extent of species depletion
could be resolved, deep conflicts over competing values complicate the
search for international solutions. A final source of dispute is the
distribution of costs; developing countries argue that they should not
have to bear the costs of their late development.
Both global warming and biodiversity were on the agenda of
the 1992 Rio Conference organized by the United Nations. The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change signed at
the conference has neither clear timetables nor goals for reducing the
level of greenhouse gases.123 American negotiators reportedly feared
that such timetables would have more legal force in the United States
than elsewhere. In the aftermath of this agreement, however, both
the European Union and the United States set a target of reducing
their own carbon dioxide levels to 1990 levels by the year 2000.124 It is
not clear, however, what these targets mean. In the United States,
the Clinton Administration proposed only voluntary compliance pro-
grams for substances that contribute to global warming.125 In 1990,
the German Cabinet committed itself to reducing carbon dioxide
emissions to seventy-five percent of 1987 levels by 2005. But this
policy is a goal, not a legally binding condition.126
Furthermore, stronger measures not required by the
Convention, such as taxes on carbon to reduce greenhouse gases, are
unlikely in the near future. The United States has not endorsed a
carbon tax, and the European Union's backing for a tax on carbon is
conditioned on the agreement of all members of the Organization for
123. UNCED: Rio Conference on Environment and Development, 22 Envir. Policy & L. 204,
207 (1992). For the text of the Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, April 30-May 9, 1992, 22 Envir. Policy & L. 258-64 (1992). The Convention had
been ratified by 55 of the 160 signatory nations by February 1994. It went into effect March 21,
1994. U.N. Conference Finds Greenhouse Gases Must Be Cut, Reuters (Feb. 18, 1994) (available
on LEXIS, NEWS library, REUWLD file). The United States was the first industrial nation to
ratify the treaty in October 1992. Earth Summit's Effectiveness Questioned a Year Later, Nat'l
Pub. Radio, Morning Edition (June 7, 1993) (available on LEXIS, NEWS library, NPR file).
124. UNCED: Rio Conference, 22 Envir. Policy & L. at 207; U.S. Signs Accord on
Biodiversity, Chi. Trib. § 1, at 14 (June 5, 1993).
125. Margaret Kritz, Lukewarm, Nat'l J. 2028-31 (Aug. 14, 1993); John H. Cushman, Jr.,
Clinton Urging Voluntary Goals on Air Pollution, N.Y. Times A23 (Oct. 19, 1993).
126. See generally Jeannine Cavender and Jill J~ger, The History of Germany's Response to
Climate Change, 5 Intl Envir. Aff. 3 (1993) (providing a history of the climate change policy
debate in Germany). The authors stress the role of the nuclear industry, particularly in the
aftermath of Chernobyl, in using fears of the greenhouse effect as an argument for nuclear
power.
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Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD").127 The German
environmental minister supports a carbon tax only in the framework
of such a broad initiative.18 The fear of competitive losses prevents
any country or group of countries from acting unilaterally, and inter-
national institutions are not strong enough to impose a solution.
More progress is being made on biodiversity. Germany signed
the biodiversity treaty at the Rio Conference, though the United
States did not. The Clinton Administration signed the treaty in June
1993.19 Bush Administration fears that the treaty might harm
intellectual property rights were apparently exaggerated because the
Industrial Biotechnology Association, representing 80% of the
industry, endorsed the treaty.13 This situation may be another case
of an industry that fears unilateral American action favoring an
international agreement that imposes similar restrictions on all
producers.'3'
The mixed record on the greenhouse effect and biodiversity
suggests that global problems imposing heavy costs on advanced
countries will be difficult to solve. Limits on greenhouse gases will
raise energy costs world-wide. Although the immediate costs will fall
127. Bronwen Maddox and Paul Needham, Business and the Environment: German
Industry Snubs Carbon Tax, Financial Times 18 (Sept. 30, 1992).
128. At Rio, Chancellor Kohl stated that Germany planned a 25-30% cut in carbon dioxide
emissions by 2005 relative to 1987 levels. Environmental Minister Klaus T6pfer claims that a
carbon tax is necessary to meet this goal-a method opposed by German industry. Id.
129. U.S. Signs Accord, Chi. Trib. § 1, at 14 (cited in note 124). While the pact has been
sent to the Senate, it has not yet been ratified by the United States. The Convention entered
into force on December 29, 1993 once it had been ratified by 30 countries. Current Report, 17
Int'l Envir. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 12, 1994).
130. The Biodiversity Convention would encourage the transfer of biotechnology to develop-
ing countries. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, Art. 16, §§ 1-2, 31 I.L.M. 818, 829 (1992) ("Biological
Diversity Convention").
The U.S. was afraid that the Convention ... might slow down the application and
industrialisation of bio-technologies and would not afford protection for intellectual
property and could reduce royalties, especially for pharmaceutical companies, needing
vital raw material, for life-saving drugs.... The U.S. was, however, the only indus-
trialised country not to have signed the Convention.
UNCED: Rio Conference, 22 Envir. Policy & L. at 207 (cited in note 123). See also Graeme
Browning, Biodiversity Battle, Natl J. 1827-30 (Aug. 8, 1992). Browning suggests that the
Industrial Biotechnology Association, representing 80% of the industry, could have accepted the
treaty. Id. at 1829. In fact, the language of the Convention is protective of intellectual property.
Article 16, section 2, in discussing technology transfers to developing countries states: "In the
case of technology subject to patents and other intellectual property rights, such access and
transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights." Biological Diversity Convention, 31 I.L.M. at
829.
131. In the spring of 1993 the industry was urging the Administration to sign so that the
United States could participate in the international negotiations over the interpretation of the
intellectual property portions of the treaty. 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 961 (June 9, 1993).
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heavily on newly developing countries, such as China, global limits
will affect all users of fossil fuels. These costs could be substantial if
stringent limits are imposed. Efforts to subsidize poorer countries
would further increase the burden on wealthier ones.
In contrast, preserving species by preserving tropical rain
forests is a perfect political issue for industrially developed countries.
Germany has no tropical rain forests, and the United States has only
small enclaves in outlying areas. Political actors can claim great
concern, 132 but make clear that global cooperation is necessary. If
such cooperation is not forthcoming, then little can be done at home. 13
Possible unilateral responses, such as limiting the import of tropical
woods, have the advantage of being supported by domestic competi-
tors.13 Even when the global treaty on biodiversity goes into effect, it
will impose only marginal costs on major industrial powers.
IX. CONCLUSION
The U.S. constitutional structure places no constraints on the
assignment of environmental responsibilities to different levels of
government so long as the Interstate Commerce Clause is not
violated. As a result, strong federal statutes exist in most areas of
environmental protection. The German constitution is more specific
in assigning environmental responsibilities and mandates that the
states administer most federal regulatory programs. The constitu-
tional assignment of responsibilities to government levels in Germany
is inefficient in failing to account adequately for the geographical
extent of pollution problems.
132. Germany's politicians are on record as being concerned about endangered species and
the loss of the rain forest. Dr. Klaus Tapfer, Abristung zwischen Mensch und Natur, Das
Parlament 6 (June 5, 1992). According to Environmental Minister T6pfer, "international species
protection must have priority over the economic interests of individual states and traders."
Gabrielle Wile, "The Future's Ark" Mustn't Become Empty, press release, Inter Nationes 2
(1992). According to Chancellor Kohl: "The destruction of the tropical rain forest and the hole
in the ozone layer.., concern the people of Latin America, just as much as those in Europe and
in all the continents of the world." 250 Millionen DM far den Regenwald, Umwelt und
Entwicklung 1 (Nov. 1991).
133. Similar points were made by opposition party members in the Bundestag debate over
the Rio Conference. Ginter Pursch, Regierungserkldrung zum Rio-Umweltgipfel: Zwischen
Chancen und Skepsis, Das Parlament 1 (June 5, 1992).
134. Monetary contributions to international projects can also be good for one's image
without imposing much pain. Thus, Germany has contributed DM 250 million to help fund a
three-year pilot project on rain forest preservation sponsored by the World Bank. This contri-
bution is 15% of the project's budget. See Tropenwalderhaltung, Umwelt 13 (Jan. 1992); Ein
Alarmsignal zum Handeln, Umwelt und Entwicklung 6, 7 (Dec. 1991).
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Both Germany and the United States have statutes that fail to
recognize the complex regional and interregional character of air and
water pollution. Lawmakers give existing jurisdictional boundaries
too much weight in policy and implementation. In the United States
federal laws frequently impose too much uniformity on the country in
the form of treatment requirements or discharge levels. The German
focus on licenses and on state and local control of implementation
creates particular difficulties in dealing with pollution that crosses
political borders.
With regard to local problems, the cleanup of existing hazard-
ous waste sites shows how a seemingly local problem can require
national intervention in the presence of mobile firms and income
disparities. The U.S. solution recognizes these national concerns, but
does so in a cumbersome, rigid, and costly way. The German solution
places too much responsibility for cleanup on the Ldnder. Recycling
policy is a counter-example to my general claim that Germany is too
decentralized. Germany is much farther along the recycling path
than the United States, but the government has designed an exces-
sively standardized scheme.
The failure of the international community to deal sensibly
with global problems cannot be blamed on either Germany or the
United States although the involvement of both countries is necessary
for further progress. International cooperation may be facilitated by
U.S. statutes that give industry an incentive to seek global solutions.
This possibility provides a political-economic justification for domestic
polices that otherwise would appear ineffective.
In short, the constitutional and statutory assignment of envi-
ronmental responsibilities in both countries leaves much to be de-
sired. Germany puts too much emphasis on implementation by state
and local governments; the United States, too little. Yet, the underly-
ing problems are more subtle than this simple generalization.
Germany contains examples of excessive centralization, and the
United States delegates some decisions with inteijurisdictional
consequences to lower-level governments. In both countries, existing
political jurisdictions are not well fitted to the reality of many
environmental problems. Germany and the United States need to
recognize more fully the complex regional and inteijurisdictional
character of pollution.
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